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INTRODUCTION

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), created by the Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906,1 recently entered its second century.
t

Volunteer Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
Although commentators often cite 1906-the year Teddy Roosevelt signed the Federal Food and Drugs Act-as the year of the FDA's birth, see, e.g., Food and Drug AdministraI

tion, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 248, 250 (George T. Kurian et al.

eds., 1998) (referring to the Act as the Pure Food and Drugs Act), the Secretaries of the
Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce and Labor combined to enforce the original Act.
See Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 384, § 3, 34 Stat. 768, 768-69, repealed
by Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 717, § 201 (d), 52 Stat. 1040,
1040 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (defining the Secretary of Agriculture as
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With this new century comes new challenges, including the ever-increasing risk that the Agency will no longer enjoy the deference historically given to its policy decisions. The judicial deference given to
the Agency is usually attributed to the FDA's century-long legacy of
scientific expertise. 2 However, in recent years, the news media has
disdained the Bush Administration's political manipulation of the
FDA and has questioned the Agency's scientific integrity. This criticism of the Administration's political manipulations of the FDA (for
the benefit of conservative political constituencies) may diminish the
willingness of federal judges to defer to our nation's most distinguished regulatory Agency. 3 And if the FDA loses its legacy of deference, its ability to regulate efficiently will diminish significantly.
This Article discusses milestones in the FDA's legacy, explores the
evolution of deference to the FDA (and its empowerment as a regulator during its first century), and notes the indications of diminished
scientific independence at the hands of Bush Administration appointees serving powerful constituencies. This Article also discusses the
growing attention to the politics underlying FDA decisions in recent
years, and how that attention may diminish the FDA's carefully built
aura of scientific integrity. Further, this Article analyzes how public
recognition of the Bush Administration's political control over the
FDA may erode federal judges' views of the Agency, making them less
receptive to deference arguments. Finally, this Article explores the
already-present consequences of a politicized FDA: by examining antiabortion groups' influence over the approval process for the drug
"Plan B" and also the political motivations behind the FDA's recent
policy shift in favor of preemption, this Article concludes that political
direction of the FDA-both overt and covert-has diminished the
likelihood of future judicial deference to the Agency.

the predominate head of the Agency). Various alternative dates are cited less frequently.
See, e.g., FRAN HAWTHORNE, INSIDE THE FDA: THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS BEHIND THE DRUGS
WE TAKE AND THE FOOD WE EAT 31 (2005) ("Most people . . . date the agency to the
Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906. Peter Barton Hutt, the FDA's chief counsel from 1971
to 1975 and its unofficial historian, prefers to (date the FDA to] 1862, when the newly
created U.S. Department of Agriculture set up a laboratory to analyze food samples. It
could also be argued that the modern FDA did not really take shape until the laws were
revised in 1938 and 1962.").
2
As one commentator put it, "For almost a century, the FDA has been the Good
Housekeeping seal of approval, the Nobel Prize, and Ivory soap (99 and 44/100 percent
pure) combined." HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at viii-ix.
3
See PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA'S HEALTH: THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION, at xiv (2003) ("[The FDA] is the most known, watched,
and imitated of regulatory bodies....
regulatory agency in the world.").

[I)t has also been described as the most important
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I
THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFERENCE

An administrative agency spends much of its time developing and
enforcing regulations, conducting hearings, issuing licenses, and publishing advisory opinions. 4 The prudent federal agency official understands that all of the agency's grand rulemaking visions (or careful
licensing decisions) would be wasted if a judge vacated the agency's
actions when challenged in court.5 Thus, it is in the agency's enlightened self-interest to avoid any threat to its continued success by en6
couraging judicial deference to its actions.
One can loosely define deference as the willingness of a court to
accept an agency's interpretations of a statute or policy over competing interpretations offered by regulated persons or public interest
groups. 7 Once the agency decides the issue, a rigorous "hard look" by

a federal court might overrule the agency's interpretation
ute, 8 but a deferential review will likely accept the agency's
tion-and with it, the agency's decision regarding issuing
or rule. 9 Thus, the key to any agency's successful defense

of the statinterpretathe license
of its deci-

4 See generally 2 Am. JUR. 2D Admin. Law § 48 (2004) (describing the bulk of an
agency's purposes).
5 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (defining the scope ofjudicial review when evaluating an
administrative agency's decisions); see a/soJAMEs T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKiNG
§ 18:3 (2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter O'REILLY, RULEMAKING] (describing the levels of deference that the various agency actions may receive); Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of
Federal Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 37-39 (2002) (characterizing the various
methodologies that courts employ under Chevron when evaluating an agency's interpretation of its organic statute).
6 See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 Cow
NELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (2004) (reviewing instances when courts have refused deference
to an agency's self-interested legal interpretations).
7 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(defining the modem approach ofjudicial deference to agency statutory interpretations).
For a useful synopsis of Chevron deference see Levin, supra note 5, at 37-39. See also
O'REILLY, RULEMAXING, supra note 5, § 18:2; Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step
Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT" L. REv. 1253, 1267-68 (1997) (noting that "deference" is a
means of recognizing legislative delegation of authority) (citation omitted); Antonin
Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 513 (noting that Chevron represented the Court's decision to resolve the then-existing jurisprudential divide by sanctioning the deferential approach); Laurence H. Silberman, ChevronThe Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 827-28 (1990) (arguing that
judges must ask not if the agency's view is the best, but rather if it is reasonable); cf Mark
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83, 128-30 (1994) (arguing that courts should
employ a more rigorous approach to Chevron's second step than traditional deference).
8 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the "HardLook" Doctrine, 7 NEv. L.J.
151, 155-59 (2006) (describing the evolution and application of hard look review).
9
See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-59 (1997) (upholding as reasonable
the Secretary of Labor's interpretive rule regarding existing regulation); Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 863-64 (mandating judicial deference to an agency's reasonable construction of its organic statute). But see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255-69 (2006) (refusing to ex-
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sions is the willingness of federal judges to give deference to its expertise. Indeed, agencies fervently seek deference to ensure the
enforceability of their policy decisions.1 0 If an agency does not receive
consistent deference from the courts, regulated entities will likely
deem the agency less potent; in turn, those entities will be less likely to
respect agency decisions."1
As with any administrative agency, deference is a cornerstone of
the FDA's effectiveness.1 2 Ifit were not accorded deference, the many
hours spent formulating and promulgating rules would amount to a
waste.' 3 A historic strength of the FDA has been the deference received from courts during enforcement actions; indeed, the FDA has
long nurtured its aura of expertise in order to win the accommodating acceptance of judges. 14 In recent years, as the economic role of
the FDA has become more overt, 15 FDA drug licensing decisions have
been more controversial and more frequently litigated. 16 Therefore,
deference, now more than ever, is central to the FDA's effectiveness as
an administrative agency.
II
THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE DEFERENCE DEBATE

Given that deference is so important to the FDA's continuing efficacy, it may be surprising that the universe of individuals who control
deference to the Agency is probably fewer than fifty: the federal
judges likely to hear cases challenging the FDA will be those thirteen
judges on the District of Columbia Circuit Court, 17 a small number of
tend traditional deference to the Attorney General's interpretative rule when the
interpreted regulation failed to define the authorizing statutory language in any meaningful way).
10 See O'REILLY, RULEMAKING, supra note 5, § 18:1. Although Chevron aids the agency
in its quest for deference, it is not a total shift of power to agency decision makers. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992)
(demonstrating empirically that Chevron has not had a dramatic effect on the Court's deference jurisprudence).
11
See O'REILLY, RULEMAKING, supra note 5, § 18:1 (noting that the deferential approach announced in Chevron "is an important tool for agencies to defend their rules and
their interpretations from challengers").
12 See id.; see also id. § 18:3 (describing the various agency functions that receive
deference).
13
See generally 1JAMES T. O'Riuus., FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 4 (3d ed. 2007)
(describing the FDA's rulemaking process) [hereinafter O'REILLY, FDA].
14 See id. § 2:7 (discussing the relationship between the FDA and the Judiciary).
15 See infta Part IX.
16
Litigation between the pharmaceutical industry and the FDA occurs particularly
frequently. See generally 1 O'REILLY, FDA, supra note 13, §§ 14:1-14:3 (detailing the manifold opportunities for litigious interface between the FDA and the industry in the context
of seeking approval of a new drug).
17 Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: Roster of Presiding Judges, http://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content/udges (last visited Apr. 7, 2008); cf
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judges who sit as panel members on occasional review of the FDA
cases heard in other circuits, and those few federal districtjudges who
hear the relatively infrequent FDA lower court enforcement or injunc-

tion cases.' 8
Similarly, while FDA deference has truly global effects on the
strength of regulatory protections, the actual players advocating and
opposing deference are few. The individuals advocating deference
are the civil appellate staff of the Justice Department and the attorneys in the FDA's Office of Chief Counsel. 19 These advocates are
vastly outnumbered by the industry lawyers whose clients challenge
FDA decisions.2 0 Also, in recent years, numerous industry adversaries
opposing FDA rules have funded the "think tank" and trade associa21
tion entities who serve as stalking-horse plaintiffs against FDA rules.
Finally, a tiny handful of appellate lawyers work with nonprofit organizations that represent patients or consumers challenging FDA
22
decisions.
III
THE SUPREME COURT'S DEFERENCE TO THE

FDA

The five peaks of modern judicial deference to the FDA were the
Supreme Court decisions in the Hynson, Rutherford, Chaney, Young, and
Lohr cases. These cases merit attention at the outset in order to adequately frame the remaining discussion on deference. The common
element of these decisions was the Court's perception that the FDA
was an expert agency, and thus should be allowed to exercise discretion within its areas of primary jurisdiction.
Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the "Mini-Supreme Court," 13 J.L. &
POL. 377, 379 (1997) (noting that the Circuit's "crucial role in deciding regulatory agency
appeals[ ] have helped to institutionalize the D.C. Circuit as a [ ]'mini[ ] supreme court'
in administrative law").
18 Perhaps fifty-nine would be a better number, given the Supreme Court's constitutional authority over all federal courts.
19 See U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Office of Chief Counsel, http://www.fda.gov/oc/
occ/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
20
The Administrative Law section of the ABA has over 7,000 professional members.
Michael Asimow, Welcoming Remarks for the American Bar Association, Section of Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice, http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/asimow-welcome.pdf.
21 For example, the Washington Legal Foundation has presented numerous challenges to the FDA's powers. See Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (presenting the final outcome of a series of arguments against FDA control of
pharmaceutical company "off-label" claim statements); see also Nancy Bradish Myers, The
Interactors, in FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 94, 94-95 (Wayne L. Pines ed.,
2006) [hereinafter CENTURY OF PROTECTION] (listing a wide range of industry trade associa-

tions and consumer organizations).
22 See, e.g., Posting of Kerry Donahue to CARE To LIVE, http://caretolive.com/200711-23/ (Nov. 23, 2007) (posting of the nonprofit's counsel, challenging the FDA's decision
not to approve the immunotherapy drug Provenge).
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Hynson was a landmark in administrative law history. 23 In that
case, the Court showed remarkably broad deference to the FDA, giving the Agency virtually unreviewable authority to determine whether
a product was (or was not) a "new drug" and thus within the FDA's
regulatory jurisdiction. 24 After Hynson, the FDA had jurisdiction over
every new drug, except for those new drugs that were "generally recognized" as effective. 25 However, courts would allow the FDA broad
leeway to determine whether a new drug was generally recognized as
26
safe and effective, and thus outside its area of regulatory control.
Given the lack of judicial scrutiny, this effectively gave the FDA an
unchecked ability to determine its jurisdiction-a remarkable power
for any agency.
Rutherford further confirmed the FDA's broad jurisdiction. 27 In
that case, terminally ill patients sued the FDA for access to medications that the FDA had not yet approved, asserting that their status as
terminally ill should exempt them from waiting for a drug to pass the
FDA's efficacy proof process. 28 The Court upheld the FDA's authority
to determine the effectiveness of all new drugs-even those for terminally ill patients-because the Court was "reluctant to disturb a longstanding administrative policy that comports with the plain language,
history, and prophylactic purpose of the Act." 29 The confirmation of
the FDA's authority, in the face of these strong equitable and moral
arguments, was a clear victory for the Agency's extensive powers.
In Chaney, the Court allowed the FDA very broad prosecutorial
discretion in determining which parties it would target with enforcement actions. 30 A group of inmates sentenced to death by lethal injection sought to compel the FDA to pursue enforcement actions against
various states that, according to the inmates, were not using the lethal
injection drugs for their FDA-approved purpose. 31 The Court permit23 Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); see also
James O'Reilly, Jurisdictionto Decide an Agency's Own Jurisdiction:The Forgotten Tale of the Hynson Quartet, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 829, 830 (2006) [hereinafter O'Reilly, Jurisdiction to Decide]
(describing the historical significance of the case).
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(p)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (p)(1)
24
(2000) (defining the term "new drug"); 25 AM.JuR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 111
(2004) (explaining the definition).
25
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201 (p) (2), 21 U.S.C. § 3 21 (p) (2) (excepting "generally recognized" drugs from the definition of "new drug").
See 25 Am.JUR. 2D Drugs & Controlled Substances § 112 (2004) (stating the require26
ments a drug must satisfy in order to achieve general recognition); O'Reilly, Jurisdiction to
Decide, supra note 23, at 836-37 (noting the Court's blessing on the FDA to decide the
minimum quantum of data necessary to support a finding of general recognition).
27
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
28
Id. at 548.
29
Id. at 554.
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
30
31

Id. at 823-25.
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ted the FDA discretion to decide whether or not to pursue enforcement for violation of the new drug approval requirements, thus
limiting the scope of the Court's review over the FDA's decision not to
pursue an enforcement action. 3 2 This was a key decision because the
limited scope ofjudicial review over the FDA's enforcement decisions
is a very important form of deference.
In Young, the Court gave deference to the FDA's decision not to
promulgate a regulation that would set a safe tolerance level for a
carcinogen found in some foods. 33 The FDA believed that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) gave it discretion in
promulgating such standards, and the Court agreed.3 4 The complexities of the FDA's statutory delegation led the Court to conclude that
"we need not find that [an agency's interpretation of a statute] is the
only permissible construction that [the agency] might have adopted
but only that [the agency's] understanding of this very 'complex statute' is a sufficiently rational one to preclude a court from substituting
35
its judgment for that of [the agency]."
Finally, in Lohr, the Court deferred to the FDA's view of whether
federal medical device law provisions preempted overlapping state law
requirements. 3 6 Over a strong dissent,37 the majority found the FDA
"uniquely qualified" to interpret whether the FD&C Act preempted
state law and thus deferred to the FDA's interpretation of the preemp38
tive scope of the Act.
IV
THE TYPES OF DEFERENCE ENJOYED BY THE

FDA

The types of judicial deference to the FDA can be broadly classified into two separate categories. The first (and the earliest) form of
deference sought by the Agency is deference to its decisions regarding
which products it would pursue with enforcement actions; 39 indeed, it
32 Id. Two Justices, though concurring in the judgment, disagreed as to the breadth
of deference accorded to the FDA. See id. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 840-41
(Marshall, J., concurring).
31 Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986).
34
Id. at 979-81.
35
Id. at 981 (quoting Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S.
116, 125 (1985)).
36 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996) (deferring to the FDA's construction of the relevant statutory provision regarding the scope of preemption).
37 The split in the Court turned upon the degree to which courts should defer to
several distinct levels of precision in the FDA's licensing of new medical devices. See id. at
513 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing for a broader preemptive scope than that adopted by the FDA and endorsed by the majority).
38

See id. at 496.

39 See, e.g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 600 (1950) (holding
that a district court "ha[s] no jurisdiction to review the [FDA's] determination" about
whether it had probable cause to commence an enforcement action). See generally Edward
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was critically important to the FDA that the courts would not lightly
overturn its decisions regarding which regulated items to pursue with
enforcement actions. 40 The consequences of not receiving deference
in this area are illustrated by the experiences of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, an agency that was spun off from the FDA in
1972.41 The Commission was denied deference in numerous appellate defeats; 4 2 because of its unsuccessful attempts to enforce its own
standards, the Commission virtually ceased developing them. 43 However, unlike the failed Commission, the FDA was highly successful in
achieving judicial deference to its enforcement decisions. This success is perhaps best illustrated by the 1985 Chaney decision, discussed
above. 4 4 In discussing the FDA's enforcement decision, the Chaney
Court showed maximum deference to the FDA's prosecutorial discretion: 45 the Court held that "an agency's decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review...."46
Although the FDA received deference to its enforcement decisions, that deference has been qualified in one very important respect.
When the Agency brought enforcement cases in the district courts of
the Fifth Circuit, the judges could hold food companies to a more
stringent standard of food purity but could not be less stringent than
the FDA in its view of food safety enforcement. 4 7 The Fifth Circuit's
M. Basile & Melanie Gross, The First Amendment and Federal Court Deference to the Food and
Drug Administration: The Times They Are A-Changin, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 31, 33-35 (2004)
(describing several pre-Chevron cases in which the Court gave deference to the FDA's enforcement decisions).
40
See supra Part I.
41
In 1972, the FDA's Bureau of Product Safety folded into the new Consumer Product Safety Commission after adoption of the Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92573, § 4(a), 86 Stat. 1207, 1210 (1972) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a)
(2000)). See Fred H. Degnan & Steven B. Seinborn, Open Forum: Toys and Confectionay-A
Legally Compatible Combination,53 FooD DRUG LJ.9, 14 n.28 (1998) ("After passage of the
CPSA, the CPSC was formally established. A major component of the CPSC was [the]
FDA's Bureau of Product Safety. .. ").
42
See, e.g., Gulf S. Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137,
1140 (5th Cir. 1983); Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d
499, 527 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying deference to one part of the Commission's rule); Aqua
Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 835 (5th Cir. 1978);
D.D. Bean & Sons Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 574 F.2d 643, 653-54 (lst Cir.
1978).
43
See Anthony Sciascia, Safe or Sony: How the PrecautionaryPrinciple is ChangingEurope's
Consumer Safety Regulation Regime and How the United States' Consumer Product Safety Commission Must Take Notice, 58 ADMIN. L. REv. 689, 693 (2006) (noting that the CSPC's emphasis
on voluntary regulation has left the Agency "impotent and weak"); see also Elliot Klayman,
Standard Setting Under the Consumer Product Safety Amendments of 1981-A Ship in Regulatoy
Philosophy, 51 GEO. WAsn. L. REv. 96, 99-103 (1982) (same).
44
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
45
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., United States v. Boston Farm Ctr., Inc., 590 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1979)
(considering whether the court should defer to the FDA's "action levels" and noting that it
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statement regarding the level of the level of deference to be given to
the FDA may be typical of the deference that the FDA received for
decades:
We remand the case to the District Court for it to determine under
a correct reading of the statute whether the (regulated product] is
adulterated. It may accept as ajudicial standard the allowable tolerances now permitted by the Secretary .... A court may apply a

stricter standard than the Secretary and hold a food substance
adulterated though within the Secretary's tolerances. Considering
the positive command of the statute, the power of the court to allow
a greater departure from purity than the administrative tolerances is
48
less certain.
This one-way deference to enforcement had very practical consequences for the FDA: lawyers counseling companies regulated by the
FDA would advise their clients to settle or to avoid enforcement because deference meant that the likelihood of judicial intervention to
49
alter the FDA's established minimum levels was doubtful.
The second type of deference is to Agency interpretations of its
statutory delegation of authority over foods, drugs, medical devices,
and related products. 50 Gaining deference over these matters fortified the FDA because it could then predict that courts would support
new regulations. 5 1 Because of this, the FDA was able to regulate products that fell into the interstices between statutory categories, such as
diagnostic products52 and the labels disclosing the ingredients of
53
cosmetics.
The broad scope of deference given to FDA decisions reveals itself through examination of not only those instances in which the
could use a more stringent standard of food purity, but ultimately deciding the matter on
other grounds); United States v. 484 Bags, More or Less, 423 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1970).
48
484 Bags, 423 F.2d at 842.
49
For example, 99.7% of seizures by the FDA in 1963 through 1973 were settled by
consent or default. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal, Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 177, 186 (1973) [hereinafter Hutt, Philosophy of
Regulation]; see also O'REILLY, FDA, supra note 13, § 7:3.
50

See

O'REILLY,

FDA, supra note 13, § 4:12.

See, e.g., Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
("FDA interpretations of the FDCA receive deference, as do its interpretations of its own
regulations.") (citations omitted); S.G. Loewendick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1291,
1294 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("Well-known principles govern our review of agency interpretations
of agency regulations. We owe 'substantial deference' to the agency's interpretation,
which has 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation'") (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)).
52
See United States v. Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk .... 394 U.S. 784, 797-98
(1969) (accepting the FDA's argument that Congress intended to include diagnostic devices under the term "drug").
53
See Indep. Cosmetic Mfrs. & Distribs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
574 F.2d 553, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding against the plaintiff, on procedural grounds, in
a case involving FDA regulation of cosmetics labels).
51
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facts so strongly favored the FDA that the Agency would have prevailed on the factual record alone, 54 but also those cases in which the
FDA made novel and broad interpretations of its jurisdiction over contaminants such that the Agency could only prevail if the court was
willing to defer. It is in these latter cases where the degree of deference afforded the FDA is most impressive. 55 Thus, the twin pillars of
enforcement deference and authority-delegation deference combined
to support the belief that courts would accept FDA interpretations
and applications of the FD&C Act.
V
How

THE

FDA

EARNED ITS LEGACY OF DEFERENCE

The FDA's historical roots are grounded in the pre-1900's populist reform movements of the Age of Trustbusters. 56 Teddy Roosevelt,
the legendary trustbuster of the early twentieth century, saw the FDA's
predecessor agencies as vehicles for populist control of an important
aspect of the economy. 5 7 The 1906 Food and Drugs Act was, in fact,

part of an institutional effort to constrain fraudulent practices by the
trusts of the era. 58 The founders of the FDA sought to be passionate

consumer advocates who used the power of a dispassionate scientific
approach to address safety issues. 59 Through this aura of scientific
expertise, the newly founded government agency quickly gained
credibility.
The FDA's earliest enforcement efforts involved assembling evidence of problems through careful laboratory work. For example, at
54 See, e.g., United States v. Boston Farm Ctr., Inc., 590 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1979)
(declining to pass on the deference issue because the facts were "so one-sided that any
finding [against the Agency] . . . would [be] clearly erroneous").
55
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
56
See generally Richard M. Cooper, The Strugglefor the 1906 Act, in CENTURY OF PROTECTION, supra note 21, at 25 (providing a useful history of the FDA during the nineteenth
century, up through the passage of the 1906 Federal Food and Drugs Act).
57
See Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act and the Meat
Inspection Act, 37 FooD DRUG CosM. LJ. 5, 8-9 (1982) (describing Roosevelt's role); Richard Curtis Litman & Donald Saunders Litman, Protectionof the American Consumer: The Muckrakers and the Enactment of the First Federal Food and Drug Law in the United States, 36 FOOD
DRUG CosM. L.J. 647, 648-51 (1981) (same).
58
See Theodore Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Dec. 8, 1908), in Carl A. Auerbach,
Is Government the Problem or the Solution?, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 495, 502 (1996) ("If this
irresponsible outside power is to be controlled in the interest of the general public, it can
be controlled in only one way-by giving adequate power of control to the one sovereignty
capable of exercising such power-the National Government."); Cooper, supra note 56, at
28-29 (describing the unsafe industry practices existing before widespread regulation). See
generallyJoseph A. Levitt, Keeping America's Food Supply Safe, in CENTURY OF PROTEC-rION,
supra note 21, at 135 (discussing the food adulteration and misbranding crises that sparked
the FDA's assent as America's protector of food).
59
See Cooper, supra note 56, at 45-46 (describing early Agency efforts to establish
itself as science-oriented and nonpartisan).
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the turn of the twentieth century, certain additives and food chemicals
60
were suspected of causing negative health effects for consumers.
The earliest efforts of the Bureau of Chemistry, the forerunner of today's FDA, were to ensure food safety through the use of hands-on
experiments with food ingredients. 61 The Bureau's founder, Dr. Harvey Wiley, paid volunteers to dine on high doses of selected additives
in order to establish which of the additives were harmful at given
doses. 62 Dr. Wiley's "Poison Squad" drew great publicity for the new
63
agency.
As originally conceived, the FDA was to use its scientific skill to
protect the public from contamination and fraud. 64 The Agency
would develop scientific evidence for federal prosecutors, thereby assisting those prosecutors in pursuing the snake-oil promoters who defrauded gullible consumers or adulterated common foods. 6 5 Federal
trial courts of the early twentieth century were not likely to be aggressive consumer protectors, but more progressive judges gave deference
to antifraud efforts of the new Agency; early on, the Agency won a
66
number of important cases.
Courts have been quick to give deference to the FDA because of
its role as "gatekeeper" for new drug approvals.6 7 This gatekeeper
role eventually turned the FDA's approval of a new drug application
into the international "gold standard" on product safety and effectiveness, as well as the final word on permission for a new drug's entry
into the U.S. marketplace. 68 This confidence in the FDA exists because of the Agency's reputation for superior science and expertisenot for its doctrinal or political policies.
60

See id.

See Suzanne White Junod, The People Who Ate Poisons, in CENTURY
supra note 21, at 52, 52.
61

6

OF PROTECTION,

See id.

63 See Cooper, supra note 56, at 53; Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History
of Government Regulation ofAdulteration and Misbrandingof Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2,
51-52 (1984).
64 See Cooper, supra note 56, at 66.
65

See Peter Barton Hutt, PDA Comes of Age: A Century of Change, in CENTURY OF PROTEC-

TION, supra note 21, at 99, 115 (noting that the 1906 Act authorized criminal sanctions).
66 The breakthrough case for the FDA's predecessor, the Bureau of Chemistry, came
when the Supreme Court held that the operative term "may" in the food adulteration
prohibition was to be broadly construed-if the contaminant "may possibly injure the
health" of consumers, it could be condemned. United States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator
Co., 232 U.S. 399, 411 (1914); see also Hutt & Hutt II, supra note 63, at 57 (noting the
paramount importance" of the opinion).
67 See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817, 828 (3d Cir.
1998) ("[T] he FDA is a gatekeeper charged with the responsibility of protecting the public
from unreasonable risks of injury . .

").

68 See HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at viii (noting that "poll after poll has always shown
[that the FDA] is one of the most trusted arms of the entire government"); Susan F. Wood,
When Politics Defeats Science, WASH. PosT, Mar. 1, 2006, at A17.

950

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:939

The FDA grew into its gatekeeper role after the 1962 amendments to the FD&C Act, which expanded the statutory drug approval
criteria from the traditional condition-that the drug be safe-to require that the drug be efficient in treating the medical condition for
which it is prescribed. 69 The 1962 amendments are of an historic importance because they gave the FDA power to disapprove a drug that
was deemed safe but was not fully proven to be effective, and to select
which drugs had shown sufficient effectiveness to justify approval despite their potential safety risks. 70 Thus, because FDA approval was a
requirement for market entry of all new drugs, the amendments imposed an expensive burden on sponsors to prove the clinical effectiveness of each new compound prior to market entry. 7' Judicial
deference to this approval process was a critical concession in favor of
the FDA. 7 2 Additionally, the [-ynson and Bentex Courts gave the FDA
enormous discretion to fix the norms for drug adequacy. 73 Receiving
judicial deference to its ability to determine its own jurisdiction allowed the Agency to expand its scope with diminished judicial over74
sight-the ultimate in deferential review of agency powers.
VI
How THE FDA's PowERs EVOLVED WITH DEFERENCE
The next phase of the FDA's history saw the Agency's decisions
elevated to a rarified status, achieving a degree of judicial deference
that rose to the highest degree possible, short of an express mandate
from Congress. This deference caused the Agency's power to evolve
in two important ways.
First, as in Hynson,75 the Supreme Court gave deference to the
FDA's decisions about which drugs were within its jurisdiction. 76 In
the period after Hynson, the FDA began to treat its authorizing statute
as a starting point for new regulations rather than a finite limit on
69 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
70
See id. § 102.
71
See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)
(2007) (listing the post-marketing reporting requirements); O'RELLY, FDA, supra note 13,
§ 13:85 (discussing the post-marketing reporting requirements).
72
See supra Part I.
73
See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm., Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 653-54 (1973) (holding that
the determination of whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective is a determination "peculiarly suited to initial determination by the FDA"); Weinberger v. Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973) (allowing the FDA to determine what
drugs were within its control).
74
See O'Reilly, Jurisdiction to Decide, supra note 23, at 830 (discussing the Hynson quartet of cases and the grant of deference to the FDA).
75
See supra Part III.
76
See Hynson, 412 U.S. at 627 ("[The FDA's] jurisdiction to determine whether it has
jurisdiction is as essential to its effective operation as is a court's like power").
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them.7 7 The former Chief Counsel once described the FD&C Act as a
constitution, within which any acts not proscribed could be taken by
the Agency. 78 This spirit of legal ingenuity, of finding ways to justify
rules without secure legislative roots, led to a series of challenges in
the courts; judicial deference was the special advantage that allowed
the FDA to prevail. 79 Courts found that the FDA's determinations
merited special deference because of what one judge called "latitude
inherent in the statutory scheme" that favored the FDA. 80
Second, the Court deferred to the FDA's assertions of its power to
impose strict liability in enforcing the criminal provisions of the FD&C
Act, even though criminal law is rarely deferential. 81 The public
health purpose of the Act was the basis for such strict liability in the
1943 Dotterweich case; 82 the Court then expanded that deferential
norm in its 1974 Park decision. 8 3 Courts thereafter applied strict criminal liability in multiple appellate cases, thereby augmenting the
FDA's deterrence of violators. 8 4 This deference to the FDA's potential
use of strict liability criminal enforcement is important because it
likely directly deters misconduct by regulated firms, since any rational
FDA-regulated entity's managers will always seek to avoid going to jail
for their acts or omissions. 85 Further, this deference is noteworthy
because imposition of individual strict liability for violations by a regulated entity, without proof of the individual's knowledge or guilt, oc86
curs only rarely in American criminal law.
The special judicial deference granted to the FDA also had important effects outside the judicial branch. Until 1994, the field offices of the FDA worked together with the Department of Justice to
prosecute all civil and criminal cases. 8 7 As a result of this deference,
77
See Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation, supra note 49, at 179 ("[T]he fact that Congress
simply has not considered or spoken on a particular issue certainly is no bar to the Food
and Drug Administration exerting initiative and leadership in the public interest.").
78
See id. at 178.
79 For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accorded
deference to the Agency's view of how its amended cosmetics-labeling regulations affected
filing requirements. See Indep. Cosmetic Mfrs. & Distribs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 574 F.2d 553, 557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
80 Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613 F.2d 947, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
81
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 676 (1975).
82 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-82 (1943) (citing health concerns
as the reason for legislation "dispens[ing] with the conventional requirement for criminal
conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing").
83 See Park, 421 U.S. at 671 (citing public health concerns as the basis for liability, even
by means of a mere relationship to the offending corporation).
84 See O'REILLY, FDA, supra note 13, §§ 8:2-8:3.
85 See Park, 421 U.S. at 672 (discussing the deterrent effect that strict liability will have
on the managers of regulated firms).
86 See generally 21 AM. JuR. 2D CriminalLaw § 145 (1998).
87 See United States v. Gel Spice Co., 773 F.2d, 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1985) (describing
how the FDA brings an enforcement action). The FDA launched its own independent
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DOJ prosecutors routinely concurred with the FDA's enforcement decisions.8 8 The FDA had developed a reputation for careful preparation of cases; as a result, the government's arguments prevailed in the
89
vast majority of its civil and criminal enforcement cases.
VII
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DEFERENCE NoRms

The general willingness of courts to grant deference to an
agency's final regulations does have limits. Exceptions to a judicial
grant of deference include situations where: (1) the regulation was
not sufficiently definitive or final, 90 (2) there were fatal flaws in key
evidence supporting the regulation, 9 1 (3) the agency lacked authority
to make the decision or promulgate the regulation, 92 (4) the agency
acted inconsistently in interpreting its regulation, 93 and (5) the
agency changed its policy position with no notice to affected
94
entities.
enforcement branch in 1994, the Office of Criminal Investigations. Office of Criminal
Investigations, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/ora/hier/hfc300.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). The productivity of FDA criminal enforcement improved substantially
after 1994. See OFFICE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, COMPARISON CHART (2004), http://

www.fda.gov/ora/about/enflstory2004_archive/ch6/ocicharts.pdf.
88 The Department of Justice prosecutes approximately ninety percent of the cases
referred by the FDA. Cf Joel E. Hoffman, Enforcement Trends Under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act-A View from Outside, 31 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J. 338, 348 (1976) (noting
that the Department ofJustice declined to prosecute ten percent of those cases); Robert L.
Rabin, Agency CriminalReferrals in the FederalSystem: An Empirical Study of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1091 (1972) (same).
89 For post-1994 conviction rates, see OFFICE OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note
87.
90 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to a U.S. Customs Service tariff classification ruling).
91 See Almay, Inc. v. Califano, 569 F.2d 674, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (refusing deference to the FDA's definition of "hypoallergenic" due to a lack of sufficient supporting
evidence).
92 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 268 (2006) (holding that the Attorney General did not have the authority to issue an interpretive rule regarding medical policy);
Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food & Drug Admin., 318 F.3d 92, 101, 104 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding "that the plain language of... the FDC Act" does not delegate certain regulatory
authorities to the FDA and that the FDA's "proffered interpretation is not reasonable").
93 See Can Mfgs. Inst. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. (CCH)
38,354 (D.D.C. 1994) (refusing deference to the FDA's rule because of inconsistent requirements imposed and enjoining the FDA from enforcing the rule).
94 This is an infrequently used, but often-successful argument. See Nw. Tissue Ctr. v.
Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 531-32 (7th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the standing of the plaintiffs
because the FDA unexpectedly modified its interpretation of the relevant rule); see also

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 ("The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its
own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the
degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the

persuasiveness of the agency's position."); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680,
698 (1991) (noting a weaker commitment to deference when an agency changes position,
but nonetheless deferring).
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A comparison of two recent preambles to FDA regulation demonstrates that, over the course of six years, the Agency has shifted toward
a view that its regulations should preempt conflicting state tort law.9 5
However, the FDA's new view carries no grant of congressional authority, conflicts with the earlier preamble, and, in any event, was not
codified in the existing regulation. 9 6
VIII
WHY THE INDUSTRY SHIFTED TO FAVOR DEFERENCE

Deference to the FDA's decisions was anathema to the industries
97
regulated by the FDA for virtually all of the Agency's first century.
When industry and the FDA clashed, the Agency used deference to its
advantage over its challengers.9 8 But, during the Bush Administration, money and power has shifted industry advocates from a staunch
anti-deference position toward remarkable aggressiveness in favor of
selective deference to the new leaders of the FDA.9 9 This change in
the industry position is due to the change in FDA management:
outside critics of the FDA became its leaders, and they began efforts to
reverse prior FDA policies.1 00 The Bush Administration's political selection of Daniel Troy as the FDA Chief Counsel was a controversial
choice: Troy had once litigated for the drug and tobacco industries
against the FDA1 0' and was appointed to replace Margaret Jane
95
Compare Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed.
Reg. 81,082, 81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000) (noting that the proposed rule would not preempt
state law), with Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3967-68 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June
30, 2006) (examining the same regulation but now arguing that it should preempt state
law).
98 Compare sources cited supra note 95.
97 Cf Basile & Gross, supra note 39, at 31-87 (explaining how the deference doctrine
gave the FDA free reign to expand and enforce its regulations).

98

See id.

99

See Ralph Lindeman, Federalism: Agencies Move to Override State Law As Part of Federal

Rulemaking Process, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 66, at C-1 (Apr. 6, 2006) ("Industry is unlikely to mount a court challenge to the new rules, at least on the preemption

issue, because it favors business interests.").
100 See Stacy Schultz, Mr. Outside Moves Inside, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 2003,
at 63 (discussing how Daniel Troy, a lawyer who fought to curtail FDA regulatory schemes,
became head of the FDA's legal division under the Bush Administration).
101
See Michael Kranish, FDA Counsel's Rise Embodies U.S. Shift, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE,
Dec. 22, 2002, at Al ("Troy's journey from relentless litigant against the FDA to its guiding
legal star encapsulates the transformation of medical regulation under the Bush administration."); Schultz, supra note 100; Michael Steel, PDA Signs Up an Opponent, NATIONAL J.,
Sept. 22, 2001, at 2934 (noting the Senate Democratic Whip's statement that President
Bush's selection for FDA Chief Counsel "has consistently been on the wrong side of consumer issues in his private practice"); see also Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331,
331-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Porter, who disfavored federal preemption of tort cases. 10 2 Once in
office, Troy publicly called upon industry advocates to suggest private
tort cases into which the FDA could intervene on their behalf,10 3 an
unprecedented move for an FDA Chief Counsel. 10 4 Troy sought to
make a new policy argument that drug approvals by the FDA should

preempt all state tort remedies for consumers injured by prescription
10 5
drugs.
The pharmaceutical industry swiftly embraced Troy's new policy
and supported the FDA's request for deference in numerous tort
cases because preemption could shield industry tort defendants from
the expense and uncertainty of products liability suits. 10

6

Advocates

for the regulated firms became aggressive champions of deference to
the FDA's new views of preemption in private civil tort cases.1 0 7

It

seemed an ironic about-face: longtime industry opponents of judicial
deference had been converted by the Bush Administration's willingness to intervene in support of industry defendants.
The media coverage of this reversal was remarkably broad and
consistently skeptical. For example, one journalist reported that
"[t]he FDA's efforts on behalf of drug and medical-device makers is
part of a broader Bush administration effort to curb lawsuits arising
from personal injuries."1 0 8 The stark political basis for the FDA policy
reversal became transparent to the media, and perhaps even to the
See Margaret Jane Porter, The Lohr Decision:FDA Perspective and Position, 52 FOOD &
L.J. 7, 7-8 (1997) (noting the Agency's long-standing presumption against
preemption).
103
See Daniel E. Troy, FDA Involvement in Product Liability Lawsuits, UPDATE: FOOD &
DRUG LAW, RErs., & EDUC. MAO., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 4; see also Catherine T. Struve, The FDA
and the Tort System: PostmarketingSurveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587, 589 n.5 (2005) (describing comments that Mr. Troy made
at a legal education conference and noting that they were in favor of preemption).
104
See Struve, supra note 103, at 588-89 (describing Mr. Troy's actions as "controversial"). Clinton Administration appointees did take an occasional position in favor of the
preemption position, but no prior FDA official had actively solicited preemption cases for
FDA intervention. See Anne C. Mulkern, Watchdogs or Lap Dogs? When Advocates Become Regulators, DENVER POST, May 23, 2004, at IA.
105
Rep. Maurice Hinchey criticized Troy's actions. See 150 CONG. REc. H5598-99
(2004) (statement of Rep. Hinchey) (requesting a $500,000 reduction in appropriations
for the FDA Office of Chief Counsel in retaliation to Mr. Troy's preemption policy); Congressman Maurice Hinchey, FDA is Placing Corporations Above Public, http://www.house.
gov/hinchey/issues/fda.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (listing documents collected by
Rep. Hinchey to support his anti-Troy position).
106
See Lindeman, supra note 99, at 7.
107
The January 2006 FDA preemption preamble followed amicus briefs, filed by
Troy's office between 2003 and 2005, in support of pharmaceutical and medical-device
company defendants. See Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2004, at NI.
108
Robert Cohen, FDA Joins Suits on Side of Industry it Regulates, SUNDAY STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), May 9, 2004, at 1; Kathleen Kerr, Can FDA Seal be Broken?, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 11, 2004, at A26 ("Some legal experts say the government is using a back-door approach to achieve tort reform-a move to reduce huge payments to plaintiffs in liability
102
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handful of judges to whom their arguments are being addressed. 109
For example, in a 2008 Supreme Court case, FDA pleas for deference
were refused; both the majority and the dissent noted that the FDA
should not receive the normal degree of deference because of its dramatic policy reversal. 1t 10
Ix
How THE

FDA's

INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMICS

OF DRUG APPROVAL EXPANDED

The development of a new drug is a high-stakes gamble.' 1 ' Winners are rewarded with patent extensions and rights to exclusive sale,
while marketers of the drug receive federal and state reimbursement
for Medicare and Medicaid costs and for other federal drug program
purchases.11 2 The FDA's ability to select the winners from among
those seeking approval makes the Agency the essential gatekeeper in
the approval of drug products. 11 3 This gatekeeper role must be neucases."). See generallyThomas Ginsberg, Litigation Inoculation:New FDA Policy Aims to Preempt
Suits over Labels. A Judge Here Said It Was Right, PHIA. INQUIRER, July 9, 2006, at El.
109 See, e.g., Mulkern, supra note 104 ("The president's political appointees are making
or overseeing profound changes affecting drug laws, food policies, land use, clean-air
regulations and other key issues."); Neil Steinberg, Why Not Vaccinate the Right Against
Wrong, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Mar. 13, 2006, at 24 ("The really jaw-dropping part is the administration's view of any medical advance that might lessen the wages of sin.... Lives would be
saved by the vaccine [to prevent a common sexually transmitted disease], but the
politicized Bush FDA will probably deny approval, as the disease-like all VD-is a handy
ally to the Religious Right in its battle against sex."); Leonard Zehr, Drug Approvals Seen
Slowing, GLOBE & MAIL (Canada), Dec. 10, 2001, at B3 ("The appointment of a new FDA
commissioner has become highly politicized and is likely to result in the appointment of
an 'ideal Republican' rather than an 'ideal commissioner."').
110 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008). The Court ultimately
declined to decide whether the FDA should be accorded deference, instead ruling in favor
of the industry defendant's claim of preemption because of express terms in the statute.
See id. at 1009.
111
See, e.g.,
Susan Todd, Sunken Treasure: The Next Weapon in the Fight Against Cancer May
Come from a Tiny Sea Creature Even Fish Don't Find Interesting, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.),
Oct. 24, 2002, at 49 (noting that "[i]n the high-stakes business of drug development, companies are under pressure to produce a steady stream of new medicines" and that the
reward "could be worth billions of dollars").
112 FDA decisions directly impact $51 billion in costs of federal reimbursement for
pharmaceuticals under Medicare and related federal programs. See Allegations of Waste,
Fraud,and Abuse in PharmaceuticalPricing:FinancialImpacts on FederalHealth Programsand the
Federal Taxpayer: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 110th
Cong. 1 (Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Allegations of Waste] (testimony of Lewis Morris, Chief
Counsel to the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) (estimating the Medicaid 2005 prescription-drug costs in 2005 at $41 billion and Medicare 2005
prescription-drug costs at $10 billion).
113
See HAWrHORNE, supra note 1, at ix ("If the FDA lets us down, we are not just personally disappointed, betrayed, and angry. We could be dead."); James T. O'Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency: Effects of Counter-Terrorism Pressures upon Medical Product
Approvals, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 329 (2004) [hereinafter O'Reilly, Bombing Bureaucratic Complacency] ("This gatekeeper role allows the . . . FDA . . . to perform cost-
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tral-and perceived to be so-in order to reassure those giving deference to the Agency that the approval process is based on scientific
a1 4
merit rather than possible economic benefits.
Unlike other federal agencies that must seek adjudication by the
courts to set precedential policy decisions,1 15 the FDA has long enjoyed freedom from judicial interference with drug approval decisions. 11 6 This freedom from close judicial scrutiny, rooted in the
Hynson and Bentex decisions discussed above,1 17 had a liberating effect
on the FDA's operations."i 8 The FDA assumed that it had absolute
gatekeeper power and could determine the fate of privately sponsored
drugs without serious risk of judicial reversal." 9 Accordingly, it acted
with great independence.
In the past, federal judges acquiesced to this independence by
readily showing deference to the FDA's determinations of drug
safety.'20 However, that was back in an era when the Agency declined
to get involved in pricing and value-comparison issues for new
drugs.' 2 ' That era came to an end during the Bush Administration.
Led by a former White House economic staff member, Mark McClellan, who was named Commissioner of the FDA in 2003, the FDA became a player in economic regulation. 122 Soon after his appointment,
McClellan expressed his concern about rising drug prices, announcing that the FDA and other agencies "must do more to control healthcare costs" amid concerns about "rising spending on prescription
benefit analysis and then reject or accept the consequences of the entry of new medical
products into the American marketplace. Until recently, these choices were tradeoffs
made carefully and based on the cautious balancing of medical, economic, and scientific
interests.").
114

See O'Reilly, Bombing BureaucraticComplacency, supra note 113, at 349-50 (explain-

ing the negative implications of the FDA abandoning its "neutral gatekeeper" role in order
to consider the economic concerns involved in drug approval).
115 The FDA and other administrative agencies make adjudicative licensing decisions.
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2007) (setting standards for the FDA's approval of new drugs).
However, only the federal courts can make certain adjudicative decisions, such as the
agency's selection of defendants for court-enforcement cases in antitrust challenges under
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (vesting antitrust subject-matter jurisdiction in the federal courts).
116 See supra Part III.
See id.
See O'Reilly, Jurisdictionto Decide, supra note 23, at 835-36 (explaining that the Hynson case gave the FDA considerable freedom, which "allow[ed] the FDA's jurisdiction to
117
118

reach more drug products[,] ...to ignore the common marketplace experience of drug
effectiveness[,) . . . [and] to decide subjectively what studies had or had not been adequately performed").

119

See id. at 838.

See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1979).
See Alicia Ault, McClellan's FDA: Boon to Industry, Consumers, or Both?, 362 LANCET,
Aug. 2, 2003, at 379 (noting that McClellan's tenure represents a transition to focusing on
economic issues in drug development).
120
121

122

Id.
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drugs. ' 123 But while McClellan's tenure marked a loss of Agency independence, it was not the beginning of deference's decline.
The credibility of the FDA as a neutral scientific gatekeeper for
new drugs suffered several setbacks during the latter part of the
Agency's first century. First, in 1984, Congress appeared to lessen the
standards for drug product market entry, favoring economic advantages over detailed scientific evaluation of certain drugs. 12 4 Those
amendments provided that generic alternative versions of new drugs
need not demonstrate their scientific merits by controlled human
clinical trials and could be marketed despite their lower effectiveness
than the research-based product they sought to copy. 12 5 Second, in
1989, the FDA became engulfed in scandal when news broke that
members of the Agency's generic drug approval staff had received
bribes and gifts to expedite certain applications. 12 6 In response, Congress tightened the standards for filing generic drug approval applications. 127 Third, in 1992, the process of new drug approval became
part of an express economic tradeoff in a new law, the Prescription
Drug User Fee Act.'12
Reacting to the perception that the FDA was
overly cautious in its review of drug applications, Congress commanded the Agency to meet strict time deadlines for drug approvals 1 29 and produced a system that commentators have criticized as rife
with conflicts.' 3 0 Finally, in 1994, Congress responded to the concern
128
See Mark McClellan, Remarks of the Commissioner of Food and Drugs, 58 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 191, 192 (2003).
124
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(0) (2000) (allowing the filing of, and stating the requirements for, an abbreviated
application for the approval of a new drug).
125
A generic drug may be less effective in delivering the active ingredient to the target
organ, so long as the FDA considers it "bioequivalent" to the delivery of the pioneer drug
that it copies as determined by the test methods that the FDA sets under 21 C.F.R. § 320.23

(2007).
126

See Peter Barton Hutt, Yes, Virginia, There Have Been Scandals, in CENTURY

OF PROTEC-

TION, supra note 21, at 78, 79; Jeffrey Yorke, FDA Ensures Equivalence of Generic Drugs, FDA
CONSUMER, Sept. 1992, at 11.
127 See Generic Drug Enforcement Act of 1992 § 2, 21 U.S.C. § 335a (preventing a

person from filing a generic drug approval application if that person previously has been
convicted of a felony in connection with a drug approval application).
128
Pub. L. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
129
See id. § 102(3) (citing 138 CONG. REc. H9099-H9100 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992) to
require the FDA to approve breakthrough drugs within six months and all other drugs
within twelve months). In order to meet these goals, Congress gave the FDA additional
funds in the form of drug sponsor application fees. See id. § 736 (authorizing the FDA to
receive fees in order to expedite the applications of drug applications). Additionally, the
deadlines are enforceable statutory commands. See Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d
29, 40-41 (D.D.C. 2006) (enforcing the Act against the FDA).
130 See, e.g., HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 151-53 (noting that the Act was exposed to
criticism from both industry groups and consumer advocates); Christopher-Paul Milne,
Exploring the Frontiersof Law and Science: FDAMA 's PediatricStudies Incentive, 57 FooD & DRUG
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that irrational FDA bureaucrats would constrain the freedom of consumers to take their vitamins1 3 1 by restricting the Agency's ability to
regulate vitamin drugs marketed as "dietary supplements.' ' 1 32 This
legislation, which passed over the FDA's strong objections,1 33 dramatically reduced the FDA's delegated authority in this product
34
category. 1
These setbacks have contributed to the FDA's recent evolution
from a protector of safety to an evaluator of the new drug efficacy for
consumers; additionally, it is now a facilitator to drug companies, allowing them to quickly realize the economic benefit of new therapies. 135 The latest impetus for this evolution is likely attributable to
the economics that were introduced into the FDA when Mark McClellan took charge of the Agency. 136 The FDA took on a more express
economic advisor's role regarding the selection of preferred patient
therapies for federal reimbursement programs: efficacy approval by
the FDA is now generally a prerequisite to federal benefit payment for
the drug, vaccine, or medical device in use for Medicare patients'
care. 137 The FDA approval policies therefore have an underlying importance within the federal healthcare payment system, directly imL.J. 491, 512 (2002) (discussing "public criticism that user fees have compromised the
agency's capacity to deal with industry at arm's length").
131 The FDA gave Congress plenty to concern itself about. See, e.g., Letter from Mark
V. Nadel, Assoc. Dir., Nat'l and Pub. Health Issues, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res.; Senator Nancy L. Kassebaum, Ranking
Minority Member, Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res.; Representative John D.
Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce; Representative Carlos J.
Moorhead, Ranking Minority Member, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce (July 2,
1993) (on file with the United States General Accounting Office, B-252966) (noting the
various actions that the FDA had taken against dietary supplements).
132 See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 § 4, 21 U.S.C. § 342
(placing the burden of proof on the government to prove that a dietary supplement is
unsafe).
133 Peter Barton Hutt, U.S. Government Regulation ofFood with Claimsfor Special Psychological Value, in ESSENTIALS OF FUNCTIONAL FoODs 339, 342 (Mary K. Schmidl & Theodore P.

Labuza eds., 2000).
134
See 21 U.S.C. § 342 (creating a de novo standard of judicial review). See generally
O'REILLY, FDA, supra note 13, § 10:46.
135
See HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 286-88 (comparing Commissioner Kessler, a Clinton appointee, who focused solely on the safety and effectiveness of drugs, to Commissioner McClellan, who concerned himself with the economic policy of drug approval);
O'Reilly, Jurisdictionto Decide, supra note 23, at 347 (discussing the FDA's divergence from
its traditional role as "gatekeeper of human safety").
136 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. McClellan went on to become head
of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services but resigned in 2006. President George
W. Bush, President's Statement on Dr. Mark McClellan['s] Resignation as CMS Administrator (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060905-8.
html.
137 42 C.F.R. §§ 419.64-66 (2007) (outlining the Agency approval requirements for
drugs, biologicals, and medical devices, and indicating that approval is a prerequisite for
payment).
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pacting the approximately $51 billion cost of federal reimbursement
for pharmaceuticals under Medicare and related federal programs.13 8
One result of the FDA's changed role has been lessened judicial
deference toward the Agency in the cases challenging its approval of
generic drugs. Federal judges have rejected approvals of abbreviated
drug applications under the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 198413 9 more frequently than any prior set of
decisions in the history of the FDA.1 40 Clearly, deference was at risk
when the FDA's decisions diverged from their classical safety orienta14
tion to a more economics-oriented approach to approving drugs. '
X
THE EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POLICY
THROUGH APPOINTEES

While the FDA has historically enjoyed freedom to implement its
policies withoutjudicial interference, 142 the Agency has not always enjoyed the same independence from the Executive Branch In light of
the President's constitutional authority to ensure that the laws are
"faithfully executed," 14 3 it is questionable how much independence
the FDA should expect to receive. Can anything other than its tradition of scientific probity1 4 4 shield the FDA from the President's political agenda?
45
As George W. Bush once said, the President is "the decider."'
The law permits the President to appoint a Secretary of Health and
Human Services to his Cabinet; this Secretary has great autonomous
discretion under the drug provisions of the FD&C Act to review drug
approval applications and determine the safety and efficacy of any
138
139
140

Allegations of Waste, supra note 112, at 1.
See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nutritional Health Alliance v. Food & Drug Admin., 318 F.3d 92, 101, 104

(2d Cir. 2003) (holding "that the plain language of ... the FDC Act" does not delegate
certain regulatory authorities to the FDA, and that the FDA's "proffered interpretation is
not reasonable"); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Henney, 94 F. Supp. 2d 36, 58 (D.D.C. 2000)
(declaring the FDA's interpretation contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and remanding "to the FDA for a permissible construction of the statute"), vacated as moot sub
nom. Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2002), vacated as moot
sub nom. Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 284 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per
curiam).
141
See, e.g., Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (according deference to the FDA's statutory interpretation because the Agency read the statute to preserve economic incentives for industry competitors).
See supra Part I.
142
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
143
See supra Part VI
144
145
SeeJim VandeHei, Bush Names a New Budget Director, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2006,
at A2 (quoting President Bush's public statements in defense of Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's remaining in the Cabinet).
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drug. 14 6 As a Cabinet member, the Secretary's views of policy tend to
be fully aligned with the President's.14 7 The President also has the
power, subject to confirmation by the Senate, to select FDA Commissioners, which occupy a position below that of the Secretary.1 48 The
new FDA Commissioners (and their handful of politically appointed
colleagues, such as the legislative deputy commissioner) can be expected to change with each election cycle.1 49 However, the Commissioners who have been appointed and confirmed since the Bush
Administration arrived in 2001 have held the office for an average
tenure of about one year after confirmation. 150 The appointees tend
to pursue these jobs only in furtherance of their future careers, gaining appointment with the help of White House insiders who, in turn,
seek those candidates most likely to implement the President's policies. 151 While such political favoritism may be common in the White
146
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing the President's power to make Cabinet appointments); 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000) (detailing the Secretary's powers to review new
drug applications).
147
See President George W. Bush, Roster of the President's Cabinet, http://www.white
house.gov/government/cabinet.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (listing President Bush's
current Cabinet members and noting that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Cabinet ... is to advise the President on any subject he may require relating to the duties of
their respective offices").
148
21 U.S.C. §§ 393(d)(1)-(2).
149
See Brian Lawler, Does Leadership Count at the IDA, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Dec. 31,

2007, http://www.fool.com/investing/high-growth/2007/12/31/does-leadership-count-atthe-fda.aspx (providing a detailed accounting of the five Commissioners that have served
from January 2001 to December 2007); see also Struve, supra note 103, at 636 (explaining
that "the FDA Commissioner serves at the pleasure of the . . . Secretary [of Health and
Human Services] and, therefore, the President") (citation omitted).
150
Andrew von Eschenbach, Lester Crawford, and Mark McClellan have been the only
Commissioners confirmed since the Bush Administration took office in January 2001. See
U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Commissioners and Their Predecessors, http://www.fda.gov/
oc/commissioners/default.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (showing every FDA Commissioner and the dates they served). Von Eschenbach, a friend of the Bush family, remains in
office. See id.; see also Gardiner Harris, Bush Picks F.D.A. Chief but Vote is Unlikely Soon, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2006, at A18 (noting the family connection). Crawford, a career FDA official, served two months as Commissioner and later pled guilty to criminal ethics violations.
See Matthew J. Seamon, Plan B for the IDA: A Need for a Third Class of Drug Regulation in the
United States Involving a "Pharmacist-Only"Class of Drugs, 12 WM. & MARvJ. WOMEN & L. 521,
535 (2006); David Stout, Ex-F.D.A. ChiefPleads Guilty in Stock Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2006,
at A21. McClellan, a former White House staff member, served sixteen months at the FDA
before he was transferred to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. See Seamon,
supra, at 535; U.S. Food and Drug Admin., supra.
151
For example, one of Bush's FDA Commissioner appointees, Mark McClellan, is the
brother of the White House Press Secretary, and the son of a veteran Texas politician "with
ties to the Bush family." HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 63. McClellan used his position as
FDA Commissioner as a springboard to become Administrator for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. See Seamon, supra note 150, at 535. In fact, many FDA officials
use their position as a springboard to more lucrative opportunities. See HAwTHORNE, supra
note 1, at 150. According to the media, politics also motivated W. David Hager's appointment to the FDA Reproductive Health Drugs Advisory Committee. See Karen Tumulty,
Jesus and the FDA, TIME, Oct. 14, 2002, at 26.
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House, the Bush Administration has controlled the process more ac52
tively by appointing uncharacteristically aggressive appointees.'
White House policy staff members may be closer to "the decider,"
but no President has ever approved a new drug or medical device, and
with good reason: the FDA is a highly complex administrative body
with a detailed set of statutory requirements for each drug or medical
device. 153 While the President and his staff should generally retain
the power to make decisions that affect the Administration's foreign
policy objectives, 15 4 the specialized nature of the FDA, coupled with
its specific statutory delegation of powers, 155 suggests that decision
making within the Agency should be restricted to its independent insiders. Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler reportedly achieved
such independence from the White House staff during the Clinton
56
Administration.
When it comes to resisting political influence, the FDA is in a
severe bind. Career officials within the FDA do have the advantage of
experience and have learned to resist the desires of political appointees seeking to change FDA policies;1 5 7 thus, the Agency can generally
adapt to the winds of change from one administration to another. Inevitably, however, there are times when the visions of the incoming
decider and the FDA career officials will diverge; in such situations,
the career staffer's craftiness will only go so far. Moreover, Congress
poses the additional threat of proposing budget cuts from any agency
attempting to further an undesirable political agenda.15 8 For example, a member of the House of Representatives recently proposed
152
See, e.g., Jeanne Lenzer, FDA's Counsel Accused of Being Too Close to DrugIndustry, 329
BMJ 189, 189 (2004) (discussing charges against a Bush Appointee for subverting the public interest in favor of drug companies that provide substantial funding to the Administration); Rita Rubin, FDA Commissioner's Post Could be Difficult to Fill: Observers say Politics Weighs
Too Heavily, USA TODAY, Sep. 26, 2005, at 7D (relaying insiders' beliefs that the position
has become too politicized); Dan Zegart, The Gutting of the Civil Service, NATION, Nov. 20,
2006, at 24.
153
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355.
154
For example, the President should rightly control decisions about negotiating a

trade treaty with China.
155
See 21 U.S.C. § 393.
156
See Matthew Rees, What Makes David Kessler Run ? WKLY. STANDARD, June 3, 1996, at
25, 26 ("During the Bush years, Kessler succeeded in alienating numerous administration
officials because of his antibusiness approach, his grandstanding, and his refusal to work
with White House officials on FDA reform."); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Jane Ellen Henney: For
FD.A., an Old Hand, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1998, at A16 (describing Kessler's tenure as
"marked by... fights with Congressional Republicans who wanted . .. the agency to be
more cooperative with the pharmaceutical industry ... ).
157
See HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 153-56 (describing precautions taken to limit
drug reviewers' exposure to outside political influences).
158
See id. at 144 ("Congress controls the FDA's budget, and therefore, to FDA employees, a member of Congress carries the approximate authority of a god on Mount
Olympus.").
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amending an appropriations bill in order to reduce FDA funding as a
response to one Agency official's undesirable policy of promoting preemption.1 5 9 Given that the FDA can be buffeted on both sides by
those with political motives, the Judiciary may not wish to maintain
deference to the FDA's scientific choices.
XI
CRITICISM OF THE

FDA's

DECISION PROCESSES INTENSIFIES

From 2005 to 2006, three books critical of the political control of
the FDA were published in response to a seemingly unprecedented

surge in industry lobbying at senior levels of Health and Human Services and the White House. 160 One author was scathing in her review
of the politicized FDA, describing the Agency as a "political pawn":
It would be bad enough if the only political pressures that the FDA
had to withstand were from powerful drug and food companies with
multimillion-dollar lobbying budgets, consumer groups that pounce
every time a drug shows serious side effects, and consumer groups
that want drugs for their disease approved now. But there is more.
As a federal agency, run by a commissioner who must be confirmed
by the Senate, who must go to Congress every year for money, and
who must report to another political appointee ...,the FDA also
has to live in the hardcore world of Democrats and Republicans,
61
Congress and the White House-the world of pure politics.'
The author was especially critical of former FDA Commissioner Mc-

Clellan who, as the author noted, was "probably the most political
commissioner the FDA had ever seen." 162 The conservative economist-physician's tenure "marked the first time any FDA commissioner
had taken on drug prices as a specific, official issue ... "163 The

author noted speculation that McClellan's focus on drug prices was
politically motivated.1

64

The second author explored the scientific community's response
to multiple FDA decisions that were seemingly dictated by White
159
House Representative Maurice Hinchey proposed a $500,000 budget cut from the
FDA Chief Counsel's office as an amendment to a FDA appropriations bill. See supra note
105. The Bill, however, never made it out of the Senate. See H.R. 4766 [108th Congress]:
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food & Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriates Act, 2005, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-4766 (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) (tracking the history of the Bill and demonstrating that it failed to pass
through Congress).
160
See HAWTHORNE, supra note 1; CHRIS MOONEY, THE REPUBLICAN WAR ON.SCIENCE

(2006);

SETH SHULMAN, UNDERMINING SCIENCE: SUPPRESSION AND DISTORTION IN THE BUSH

ADMINISTRATION (2006).
161
HAWTHORNE, supra note
162
163
164

Id. at 215.
Id. at 287.
See id. at 288.

1, at 209.
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House sensitivity to its political constituencies, especially the FDA's ultimate rejection of over-the-counter sales of the Plan B contraceptive
pill.1 65 The third author examined the alleged politically motivated
suppression of dissenting views among FDA scientists by partisan managers supportive of Bush Administration policies. 166
While the merits of these authors' arguments are, of course, disputable, the books contain detailed and descriptive interviews that offer a remarkable chronicle of the trends within the FDA during the
Bush Administration. These trends are symptomatic of the substantial
problem of "regulatory capture,"1 67 largely absent in the FDA's first
century when the Agency, in accordance with its founders' goals, had
been independent, impartial, fact-intensive, and archly scientific. 16 8
The controversy and criticism typifying the current FDA era form a
colorful contrast to the Agency's stolid legacy of impartial
169
objectivity.
The above-mentioned books do not represent the only published
criticism of the FDA in recent years. In September 2005, the New EnglandJournalof Medicine ran an editorial entitled A Sad Day for Science at
the FDA, which warned that "recent actions of the FDA leadership have
made a mockery of the process of evaluating scientific evidence....
squandered the public trust, and tarnished the agency's image."'1 70 In
the same month, press coverage of the controversies deepened. 1 7 A
Republican Senator critical of the Bush Administration said that, "[i] n
recent years the FDA has demonstrated a too-cozy relationship with
the pharmaceutical industry and an attitude of shielding rather than
disclosing information .
"...-172 A Democratic Senator further decried
"a crisis in leadership . . . . weak oversight, conflict of interest and
173
poor management at the FDA."
Perhaps the most damning criticism, however, has come from
within the FDA's former ranks, as dozens of senior career officials
165
See infra Part XII; see also H-AWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 222-24 (describing how the
political influences have distorted the science behind drug approvals); MOONEY, supra note
160, at 23, 217-18 (attacking a "catalogue of politicized interferences with science" and
quoting former FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy as saying the Plan B decision "was not
a good call").

166

See SHULMAN, supra note 160, at 42-45.

167 "Regulatory capture" refers to the FDA's loss of perceived independence from the
wishes of a regulated constituency to the detriment of the public at large.
168
See supra Parts I, V (discussing the FDA's history of scientific integrity).
169
See id.
170
AlastairJ.J. Wood et al., A Sad Day for Science at the JDA, 353 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1197,
1199 (2005).
171
See, e.g., Robert Pear & Andrew Pollack, Leader of the ED.A. Steps Down After a Short,
Turbulent Tenure, N. Y. TiMES, Sept. 24, 2005, at Al.
172 Id. (quoting Sen. Charles Grassley).
173 Id. (quoting Sen. Richard Durbin).
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have departed or retired during the Bush Administration. 174 Several
of these officials testified, and spoke to the media, as whistleblowers
against the trends evident at the Agency.1 75 Some described the officials departing as the "cream of the FDA's upper echelon, a group
with much of the agency's accumulated know-how" 176 and attributed
their departure in part to the changed atmosphere of the Agency's
political climate, with its "steady erosion of influence by the career
staff." 17 7 After leaving the FDA, former Assistant Commissioner Susan
Wood expressed concern that federal health agencies were "increasingly unable to operate independently,"1

78

while FDA scientist Dr.

David Graham testified before Congress that FDA drug safety managers felt pressure to approve certain drugs, despite their substantial
risks. 179 It seems likely that damage to the FDA's reputation for probity may be hard to repair, even if such individual allegations are
proven false.
The Bush Administration appears to be blind to the possible impact of public criticism and the resulting loss of public acceptance
that the FDA could suffer. Worse yet, as the public grows increasingly
wary of the FDA's political motivations, those concerns may spread
beyond advocacy groups and media critics and into the minds of the
judges, who are asked to defer to the neutral, scientific impartiality of
the FDA. Time will tell if the FDA's tarnished reputation for scientific
impartiality will cost the Agency the judicial deference that it has so
long relied upon.
XII
CASE STUDY: POLITICS AND

"PLAN B"

The FDA's decision to delay the availability of the drug "Plan B"
to younger women provides a case study in the Bush Administration's
political influence over the FDA.'8 0 The drug, an emergency contraceptive, was developed under a cloud of political opposition that
See Zegart, supra note 152, at 24 (estimating that fifty to one hundred senior management officials left the Agency between 2001 and 2006).
175 See, e.g., FDA, Merck and Vioxx: PuttingPatient Safety First?: HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on Finance, 108th Cong. 3 (2004) [hereinafter PuttingPatientSafety First] (statement of Dr.
David Graham, Assoc. Director for Science, Office of Drug Safety).
176
Zegart, supra note 152, at 24.
177
Id. at 26 (quoting former FDA Commissioner William Hubbard).
178
Susan F. Wood, Wen Politics Defeats Science, WASH. PosT, Mar. 1, 2006, at A17.
179
See Putting Patient Safety First, supra note 175. Dr. Graham's testimony was widely
reported in the press. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, FD.A. Failingin DrugSafety, Official Asserts,
N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at Al.
180 See, e.g., Ayelish McGarvey, PlanBfor PlanB, NATION, July 18-25, 2005, at 8; William
Saletan, The Birds and the Plan Bs, WAH. PosT, Apr. 2, 2006, at B3; Russell Shorto, ContraContraception, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 48.
174

2008] LOSING DEFERENCE IN THE FDA'S SECOND CENTURY

965

called it the "abortion pill." 18 ' Opponents, citing moral objections,
fought the approval and sale of the drug vigorously at both the federal
182
and state levels.
Normally, the FDA reviews new drug applications for scientific
evidence indicating safety,1 8 3 and the process attracts little or no public attention. However, given the politically charged nature of the
drug and the possible moral implications of its use, Plan B faced
strong opposition. Anti-abortion groups characterized this new drug
as a license for promiscuity and an encouragement for teenagers to
engage in sex without fear of pregnancy.' 84 Because of the contro18 5
versy, Plan B's approval process took a distinctly different path.
Ironically, this path to approval went through a form of politically
driven alternative, "plan B."
The sponsor of the drug asked the FDA to allow Plan B to be sold
without a prescription-a common enough request. 18 6 However, the
time between when the sponsor made this petition and when the
Agency granted it was extraordinarily long. 18 7 Further, the ultimate
approval restricted the nonprescription use to women eighteen and
over, and permitted women under eighteen to obtain the drug only
by prescription.1 8 8 This was an unprecedented restraint on the retail
189
distribution of an approved drug product.
The FDA has cleared new drugs for the nonprescription market
in hundreds of cases since 1951, when Congress gave the Agency that
power. 190 Reviewers make the discretion-laden choice of whether restricting the drug to prescription-only distribution is needed to protect the public health, i.e. whether physician oversight is so essential
See Shorto, supra note 180, at 51.
See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, From Eisenstadt to Plan B: A Discussion of Conscientious
Objections to Emergency Contraception, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 787, 796-99 (2007) (discussing moral objections to emergency contraceptives).
183
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
184
See Shorto, supra note 180, at 51-53.
181

182

185

See U.S.

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS:

FDA:

DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING
OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL, GAO-06-109, at 13-30

(Nov. 2005) [hereinafter GAO].
186
See id. at 5 (comparing the Plan B process to sixty-seven other proposed prescription-to-OTC switch decisions made by the FDA from 1994 to 2007).
187
The FDA received the request in April 16, 2003 and denied it May 6, 2004. See id. at
15-16.
188
See DURAMED PHARMS., PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 1, http://www.go2planb.com/
PDF/PlanBPI.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
189
See O'REILLY, FDA, supra note 13, §§ 13:77-132 (detailing the approval process for
new drugs); see also GAO, supra note 185, at 5-6. Despite the contentious process, Plan B
sold well. See David Crary, Morning-After Pill Still Has Critics, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 23,
2007, at A12.
190 See Humphrey-Durham Drug Prescriptions Act, Pub. L. No. 215, 65 Stat. 648 (1951)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (2000)).
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that the drug cannot safely be sold over the counter to everyday purchasers. 191 The process includes a detailed review of a new drug's
safety, consumer labeling awareness, and warning label adequacy; it is
a technical process that involves the medical and scientific expertise of
FDA reviewers.' 92 Restricting Plan B's nonprescription use to women
eighteen and over is not a scientifically or medically based distinction
that would normally be made19 3when determining whether a drug is
safe for nonprescription use.
The news media reported that the power of the anti-abortion
constituency within the Bush Administration affected the approval
process of Plan B.1 9 4 The Center for Reproductive Rights, the plaintiffs in a pending suit against the FDA, also suggest that White House
involvement overwhelmed the Agency's scientific decision-making
process. 195 However, the extent to which White House interference
caused the delays in Plan B's over-the-counter approval remains unclear even today. During the approval process, extensive sparring occurred between Congress, women's groups, appointed leaders of the
FDA, drug review career staff at the FDA, and the White House policy
staff. 19 6 Depositions of political officials show the degree of political
control exercised by the White House staff. 19 7 The internal disagreements among the FDA staff concerning the Plan B controversy may
have caused the most discord ever experienced within the FDA, 198 for
the career professional staff's views on the safety of Plan B clashed
with the Administration's policies of preserving the life of the unborn
and of protecting family values.199
Reporting by the New York Times and other news media brought
the details of the intense FDA-White House conflict into the general
public's view. 20 0 Future FDA historians will probably have the benefit

of further revelations from some of the current Agency managers; to191
192
193

See 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(3).
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.125 (2007).
See Shorto, supra note 180, at 51-53; see also HAWTHORNE, supra note 1, at 32 ("The

FDA may need to consider, for the first time, the ethics of the drugs it evaluates, not just
Although the FDA may argue that its role is merely to
their safety and effectiveness ....
decide whether the drugs work safely, politicians and religious leaders will turn any 'yes' or
'no' into a socio-political statement.").
194
See Shorto, supra note 180, at 51-53.
See Center for Reproductive Rights, Depositions Indicate Bush Administration Ex195
erted Political Influence on FDA During Plan B Review Process: Center for Reproductive
Rights Requests White House Subpoena, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.reproductiverights.
org/pr 06_-0803FDADepositions.html [hereinafter Center for Reproductive Rights].
See Shorto, supra note 180.
196
See Center for Reproductive Rights, supra note 195 (making available excerpts of
197
Mark McClellan's deposition).
See, e.g., Shorto, supra note 180, at 53 (noting that Dr. Susan F. Wood, FDA's wo198
men's health official, resigned in protest over the controversy).
199 See id. at 51-53.
See, e.g., id.
200
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day, however, these participants cannot publicly explain the pressures
that the abortion issue brought to their labeling decisions. When the
whole story emerges, it is likely to be unflattering to the White House,
for the visible entanglement of Agency politics in a scientific decision
does not appeal to the general public-though it may appease some
constituents. The Plan B controversy may cause wider public skepticism about the newly politicized FDA and fuel its own "morning after"
reluctance about judicial deference to other Agency decisions.
XIII
CASE STUDY: PREEMPTION OF STATE TORTS

The Plan B debacle may be a prime example of the FDA's recent
politicization, but it is hardly the only one worth analyzing. As discussed earlier, 20 1 the use of implied preemption as a shield from tort
liability has loomed large on the policy agenda of the Bush Administration's appointees. 20 2 Preemption is a constitutional doctrine, derived from the Supremacy Clause, of power sharing between federal,
state, and local governments. 20 3 Preemption can be either expressly
mandated by congressional statement or implied through a judicial
evaluation of the conflicts between state actions and federal regulation. 20 4 Implied preemption means that the courts will assume Congress had an unstated but implied intention to bar states from local
control of a certain class of products. 20 5 State tort claims attacking a
drug or medical product's design suffer preclusion if preemption is
expressly asserted by Congress in a statute or is implied by FDA approval. 20 6 If the court finds preemption, the defendant in a drug or
medical products liability case can secure a dismissal of the state law
claim on summary judgment through federal preemption without go20 7
ing through the time and expense of a trial.
For nearly two decades, securing federal preemption of state tort
claims has been a must-win, multi-million-dollar project for the advocates of FDA-regulated industries. 20 8 Beginning with the 1990 food
201

202

See supra Part VIII.
See Allison M. Zieve & Brian Wolfman, The FDA 's Argument for EradicatingState Tort

Law: Why It Is Wrong and Warrants No Deference, 34
& LIABILITY REP., Mar. 27, 2006, at 308, 308.
203
204

BUREAU FOR NAT'L AFFS.: PRODUCT SAFETY

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

SeeJAMES T.

O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LocAL LAw: LEGISLATION,

REGULATION AND LITIGATION

§ 8.1 (2006) [hereinafter

O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION]

(discussing at length the roots of preemption law).
205

Id.

206 See id. §§ 8.1-8.8.
207 Because a cause of action cannot legally survive a finding of preemption, such a
finding results in a dismissal under FED. R. CIV. P. 56. See id. § 9.1.
208 See id. §§ 10.3, 12.5. Congress has already given preemption by statute for nonprescription drugs and medical devices, among others, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 360k, 37 9r (2000), but
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label statutes 209 and the 1997 cosmetic and nonprescription drug labeling amendments, 21 0 the FDA-regulated industries have vigorously
pursued statutory preemption of state liability sUits.211 However, some
members, of Congress have been highly critical of the industries' efforts; thus, Congress has not granted express preemption for pharmaceutical drugs. 2 12 The industry lobbyists realized that Congress was
unlikely to expressly preempt prescription drug tort law2 1 3 or to revisit
the oblique terms of the medical device preemption clause,2 1 4 and
that Congress had failed to adopt the parallel preemption of state
power in food safety regulation.2 1 5 Therefore, the Bush Administration appointees were remarkably aggressive in seeking out nonlegislative means to obtain preemption of state tort laws.2 1 6 The industries

believed that winning an FDA declaration of preemption, together
with receiving judicial deference toward such a preemptive declaration, is the next best thing to the enactment of express preemption
legislation. 217 These industries have expressed their newfound desire
to preempt state tort remedies for prescription drug "failure to warn"
218
claims in various amicus briefs.
The Agency's amendments to the complex rules regarding prescription drug labeling vividly illustrate the FDA's shift in favor of preemption. When the FDA initially proposed the amendments in 2000,
the preamble to the proposal expressly disavowed any intent to preempt state law tort actions. 21 9 But when the final rule was published
in the Federal Register in January 2006, the FDA unexpectedly
has not given preemption authority to the FDA for prescription drugs, see O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 204, § 12.5.
209
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 § 6, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1.
210
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 412, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 379r, 379s.
211
See O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 204, §§ 10.3, 12.5.
212
See generally Maurice Hinchey, The Fight to Safeguard American Drug Safety in the
Twenty-First Centuy, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 685 (2006).
213

There are many opponents of the FDA preemption argument in powerful posi-

tions. See id.; see also supra note 105.

See 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
The latest effort at statutory preemption of state food enforcement failed. See National Uniformity for Food Act, H.R. 2699, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004). The author was
among the consultants used by the Association of Food and Drug Officials, which opposed
the bill.
216
See David Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure,33 PEPP. L. Rrv. 95, 123 (2005).
217
See O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 204, § 12.5 (describing the Agency's
approach to preemption under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act).
218
See the extensive discussion of the pro-preemption arguments in Struve, supranote
103, at 589 n.5.
219
See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg.
81,082, 81,103 (Dec. 22, 2000) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) ("FDA has determined that
this proposed rule does not contain policies that have federalism implications or that preempt State law.").
214
215
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changed its position to favor preemption. 2 20 Agency staff had worked
for years on the highly detailed amendments, but the preemption
statement seems to have been hastily added into the final text. 22 1 According to former FDA Chief Counsel Troy, the passage was added to
the preamble "to signify that the agency endorsed the argument as
'official policy.'"222
The 2006 "preemption preamble" declaration was unusual in several respects. First, the public received no opportunity to comment
against preemption because the proposed rule clearly stated that no
preemption would arise from it.2 2 3 Second, the absence of public
comment meant that the usual norms for deference to an agency rule
would not apply. 2 2 4 Finally, the rule to which the preamble was attached was a public agency's mandatory rule on the details of pharmaceutical labeling, a topic to which preemption is a tangential topic at
best.

225

The FDA's statement was the culmination of the Bush Administration's lobbying effort, illustrating "how a White House can use its
administrative and legal powers to change the regulatory terrain without taking the often arduous course of asking Congress to change the
law." 226 To be sure, the Bush Administration had long tried to free
the pharmaceutical industry from tort liability through the implied
preemption defense.2 27 Contemporaneous press coverage of the pre220 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30,
2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) ("FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act, whether it be in the old or new
format, preempts conflicting or contrary State law.").
221
The amendments were proposed six years before their final adoption. Compare
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics, 65 Fed.
Reg. 81,082 (proposing the rule), with Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (promulgating the final rule).
See also Lindeman, supra note 99, at 9 (quoting the author of this Article, who noted that
"[i]f the FDA wanted to do the credible thing, they would have included the preemption
language in the rule itself and put it out for public comment...").
222 Lindeman, supra note 99, at 8 (quoting Troy as stating that the preamble represented "official policy").
223 See Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics,
65 Fed. Reg. at 81,103.
224 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (denying deference because, among other reasons, the agency ruling was "far removed ... from notice-andcomment process").
225 Preemption was addressed in the 2000 preamble not as a main issue for comment,
but as part of the analysis of impacts of the proposal. See Content and Format of Labeling
for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,103.
226 Kranish, supra note 101.
227 See Letter-Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at
26, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 02-4597) (arguing that FDA
preemption was needed because tort awards "can harm the public health by retarding
research and development and by encouraging 'defensive labeling' by manufacturers to
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emption preamble highlighted how the FDA's strong pro-preemption
statement related to similar efforts at other federal agencies under the
Bush Administration. 2 28 However, the Administration's amicus briefs,
arguing for preemption in appellate courts, had not gone as far as the
preamble did in asserting immunity; in comparison, the preemption
preamble seems tailored to most effectively aid a private entity's defensive litigation strategy2 2 9-and indeed, more defendants benefited
from the preemption preamble than from the amicus briefs. 2 30 In
retrospect, the 2006 preemption preamble appears to be the highwater mark of the Bush Administration's efforts to aid defendants in
231
medical liability cases.
Industry gloating over the achievement came rapidly after publication of the preemption preamble. For example, an industry advocacy group told members: "The key issue now is to take maximum
advantage of the courts in these cases as forcefully as possible." 2 32 A
veteran defense counsel told the media: "This is big. It opens a whole
new front in pharmaceutical products-liability litigation that most people thought was moot. Now it becomes an issue in almost every
case." 233 A PhiladelphiaInquirer story reported: "Brandishing the preamble in recent months, drug companies have papered courtrooms
nationwide with motions to dismiss failure-to-warn claims[,] [but]
[m] ost of the motions have failed." 23 4 The gold rush of tort defenders
had begun.
In 2008, the FDA went further, asserting that courts could not
accept interpretations of FDA rules presented in tort cases by witnesses who were former FDA officials, since to accept these views
would clash with its claim of preemptive power. The Missouri Court
of Appeals had accepted a former FDA executive's view of the meanavoid state liability, resulting in scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization of beneficial treatments").
228
See, e.g., Lindeman, supra note 99.
229
Bush Administration FDA appointees claimed industry labels cleared by the FDA
should not be "second-guessed by state courts that don't have the same scientific knowledge." Marc Kaufman, FDA Tries to Limit Drug Suits in State Courts, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2006, at A2 (quoting Scott Gottlieb, the FDA's deputy commissioner for medical and scientific affairs).
230
In addition to the usual drug industry-protective rationales for preemption, the
preamble also asserted medical malpractice protection for individual prescribing physicians as a rationale. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effectiveJune 30, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
231
See generally Lindeman, supra note 99 (recapping the multiple Bush Administration
efforts).
232
Id. at 7 (quoting James Dabney Miller, Member, Washington Legal Foundation).
233
Lisa Brennan, New FDA Rule's Preamble Stirs Up Bar on Both Sides, LAW.coM, Feb. 1,
2006, http://www.law.izom/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1138701910331 (quoting John
Brenner, Esq.).
234
Ginsberg, supra note 108.
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ing of a rule; the Agency supported the losing defendant with an amicus brief urging reversal. 23 5 A newsletter specializing in FDA law
observed that excluding expert testimony was "a goal consistent with
FDA's over-arching attempt to consolidate its legal authority" and that
allowing juries to consider such testimony would make it "harder to
' 2- 6
assert ... a ban on all tort suits involving FDA-regulated products.
Express preemption by statute is constitutionally permissible
under the Commerce Clause. 23 7 Indeed, Congress has expressly preempted states from labeling controls on medical devices, 238 cosmetics, 2 3 9 and nonprescription drugs, 240 and from design controls on
certain approved medical devices. 24' However, Congress has remained silent on preempting state laws regarding prescription drugs.
This silence significantly weakens the case for deference to the FDA's
views on preemption. In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
Supreme Court rejected claims that the FDA could draw implicit au242
thority from congressional silence.
In 2008, the Court upheld express statutory preemption of medical device tort claims, but did not show much deference toward the
FDA. 243 The Agency's change in position on deference undercut the
potency of the FDA's briefs claiming that its policy choice should re244
ceive deference.
A preamble that accompanies the publication of a final regulation is neither a rule nor a statute but a statement that, according to
the FDA itself, has no more effect than an advisory opinion. 24 5 Therefore, a preamble is a slender reed on which to assert a claim to judicial
deference. In the absence of legislation creating preemption, the
FDA could have issued a notice-and-comment rule endorsing preemption 246 but did not do so. The best option the industry had was to
insert a preamble statement that courts could later cite in tort cases, in
235 Strong v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. ED 87045, 2007 WL 2445938 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
Aug. 28, 2007).
236 FDA Doesn't Want Former Officials Testifying About Agency Regs, FDA WEEK, Feb. 15,
2008.
237 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
238 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000).
239 See id. § 37 9s.
240 See id. § 379r.
241
See id. § 360k.
242 529 U.S. 120, 155-56 (2000) (denying deference to the FDA's interpretation of its
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco in part because Congress was silent on whether FDA regulation preempted state tobacco regulation).
243
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008-09 (2008).
244
See id.
245
21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1) (2007).
246
Such an interpretive rule on a nonstatutory issue may have received lessened (but
still some) deference under Chevron.
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the hope of allowing private defendants to win those cases through
deferential acceptance.
XIV
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE FDA

Had the press stayed silent regarding the FDA's dramatic shift in
position on preemption and the Bush Administration's political control over the Agency, courts would likely have given deference to the
FDA's preemption preamble. However, the media focused significant
public attention on the ways in which the White House's political
2 47
choices dominated the FDA's scientific and enforcement choices.
For example, the media reported the vocal protests of consumer orga248
nizations against the FDA's claim of drug preemptive authority.
The former FDA Director of Women's Health, who had resigned in
protest over the decisions made by the FDA in approving nonprescription use of Plan B, was featured in the Boston Globe.
Today, FDA scientists are urged to be "team players," and to ignore
any concerns they have about potential risks. The culture that disparages such disagreement at the FDA is dangerous and contributes
to the agency's inability to recognize the early signals and safety
249
concerns, and to its waning scientific credibility.
Further, the Washington-based news media intensely covered the
Bush Administration's control over the FDA on numerous issues, including the politicized Plan B approval.2 50 The Denver Post also criticized Bush Administration appointees' efforts to change FDA policy,
giving front-page coverage to former FDA Chief Counsel Dan Troy's
attempt to preempt state tort cases. 25 1 The Nation vigorously criticized
various political FDA appointees, including the lawyer named Chief
See, e.g., Ault, supra note 121, at 379-80; Pear, supra note 107.
See, e.g., Stephen Pizzo, Shielding Big Pharma,ToMPAINE.COM, Jan. 25, 2006, http://
www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/01/25/shielding-big-pharma.php (quoting Joan Claybrook, president of Public Citizen, as saying: "This is a sneak attack on consumer
rights ....
Bush is once again abusing his executive powers, this time in his attempt to
protect the big pharmaceutical companies from the consequences of their actions.
Thousands of people in this country have died or been seriously injured by drugs approved
by the FDA, and this administration is saying it doesn't think people should have any recourse."). Of course, the media was not alone in its criticism: the National Conference of
State Legislatures bluntly stated that unelected FDA officials had "usurped the authority of
Congress, state legislatures and state courts." Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, FDA
Final Rule on Prescription Drug Labeling (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/
health/FDArule.htm.
249 Susan F. Wood & David Michaels, Op-Ed, Transparency, Strength at the FDA, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2007, at All.
250 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, Safety of DrugImports Questioned, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008,
at A19; Mark McCarty, Democrats Inquiring into FDA Restrictions on Label Changes, MED. DEVICE DAILY, Jan. 28, 2008, at 3.
251
See Mulkern, supra note 104.
247
248
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Counsel after Troy returned to private practice, whom the magazine
called an "ultra-conservative" without relevant job experience.252
This appalling show of political control over the FDA's legal policy was a surprising change for the small number of veteran counsel
who spent careers in the field of food and drug law. 253 In the past, the
Agency's decision makers usually paid close heed to its career managers, and rarely attracted charges that their own political ambitions
were driving the decisions of the Agency. 254 Two former FDA chief
counsels observed that "pervasive political influence" had "not been
the historical pattern" at the FDA. 25 5 However, the Bush Administration has changed the traditional role of the FDA, and turned the
Agency into one driven by political agendas.

xv
GROWING DENIALS OF DEFERENCE DURING
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION

During the current decade, the FDA has frequently lost cases
where deference previously would have aided the Agency. 256 For example, the 2006 Abigail Alliance decision rejected the FDA's restrictive
authority over the distribution of experimental new drugs and found a

novel constitutional right of patients to receive unapproved new
drugs. 257 The panel considered deferring to the FDA's contrary position but rejected its argument in a split decision. 258 Though the Abigail Alliance panel was overturned en banc, 2 59 its decision suggests a
recent hesitancy of federal courts to defer to the FDA. 260 Further, the
Zegart, supra note 152, at 28.
253 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 68.
254 For a history of prior FDA legal advisors, see Francis E. McKay, Lauyers of the FDAYesterday and Today, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 621, 627 (1975) (quoting former Assistant
General Counsel for the Food and Drug Division, Peter Hutt, describing his regulatory
philosophy: "The client will be the public through the FDA.").
PETER BARTON Hurt, RicHARD A. MERRILL & LEwis A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG
255
252

LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (3d ed. 2007).

Hutt and Merrill both served as FDA Chief

Counsel.
256 See Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption:Products Liability and the FDA, 48
B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1146-47 (2007) (noting that the FDA's efforts to obtain greater deference have been met with "limited success" and "significant skepticism"); see also HUTT,
MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 255, at 56 ("In recent years, however, FDA has not been

as consistently successful [defending its policies] in court.").
257 Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev'l. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach (Abigail Alliance 1), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695, 712-14 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
258 See Abigail Alliance I, 445 F.3d at 485 n.26.
259 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Dev'l. Drugs v. Von Eschenbach (Abigail
Alliance I1), 495 F.3d at 714.
Cf Davis, supra note 256, at 1139 ("The Court has been hesitant to permit an overly
260
aggressive assessment of federal objectives to swamp the importance of longstanding tort
principles).
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same appellate court denied deference to the FDA's views regarding
certain pharmaceutical patent issues, reasoning that the issues went
261
beyond the Agency's statutory responsibilities.
The FDA has also lost in three recent generic drug disputes. In
Ranbaxy Laboratories,the D.C. Circuit declined deference to the FDA
on its policy of conditioning the generic drug exclusivity period upon
the applicant being sued for patent infringement. 2 62 In Sandoz, a district court rejected the FDA's request for deferential acceptance of its
drug approval deadlines in an opinion that harshly criticized the
FDA's disregard of statutory mandates, 263 holding that while "the
agency's decision of how to allocate its resources is entitled to deference, . . . such deference yields when the statutory violation (here an

excruciatingly long delay) is egregious and ceases to be reasonable." 264 And in Purepac Pharmaceutical,the D.C. Circuit declined to

defer to the FDA on a determination of the coverage of a particular
patent.

265

The FDA has had similar trouble obtaining deference in other
areas. In Nutritional Health Alliance, the Second Circuit decided that
the FDA lacked the authority to regulate dosage packaging of dietary
supplements for the purpose of poison prevention. 266 In denying deference, the court noted that norms of deference did not "obviate [the
court's] responsibility to ensure that the regulatory authority exercised by the FDA is actually rooted in the statute." 2 67 And in Medical
Center Pharmacy, the district court said it would give deference to the
FDA but then rejected most of the Agency's constructions and interpretations of the amended FD&C Act. 268 As these examples indicate,

since 2000 the FDA has had increased difficulty defending statutory
interpretations of its regulatory authority.
261
See Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that "the court owes no deference to the FDA's interpretation of... a patent statute
provision which the FDA is not charged with administering").
262 See Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that
"FDA may not . . . change the incentive structure adopted by the Congress.").
263 See Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 31 (D.D.C. 2006) ("In essence, the
defendant asks the court to excuse its delay, accept governmental mediocrity and vitiate
the statute's mandatory language.").
264
Id. at 40 (citations omitted).

265 See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 877, 883-85 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (holding that an FDA determination as to the coverage of a patent was arbitrary and capricious).
266 See Nutrition Health Alliance v. Food & Drug Admin., 318 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir.
2003) ("[T] he FDC Act provisions relied upon by the FDA unambiguously fail to provide it
with authority to prescribe its unit-dose packaging rule.").
267

Id. at 98.

268

See Med. Ctr. Pharm. v. Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 2006)

(explaining that although the court "afforded the appropriate deference" to the FDA, it
had to reject the Agency's construction of the statutes at issue).
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Federal courts have also refused to defer to the FDA's claims of its
power, declared most vividly in its 2006 preemption preamble, 26 9 to
preempt a broad range of state tort claims.2 70 For example, a Minnesota district court rejected as "perverse" arguments by a drug maker
that FDA decisions preempt state tort claims:
[The] defendant's argument that it should not be exposed to fiftyone separate tort-law regimes also rings hollow. Most mass
merchants in this nation's economy sustain this burden as a cost of
doing business. If Congress intends to create a class of protected
businesses, it has the means and ability to do so. The Court finds no
2 71
proof that it has done so here.
Furthermore, in the 2006 DeSiano case, the Second Circuit denied preemption and expressed mild disdain for the FDA preamble assertions,
holding that the Agency could not supply "the clear legislative statement of intent required to overcome the presumption against preemption." 27 2 Also, in the June 2007 In re Zyprexa decision, the
eminent Senior Judge Jack Weinstein rejected the claims of a defendant pharmaceutical company that the FDA's preemption preamble
should receive deference, describing the FDA's representations of its
preemption power as "self-motivated." 273 Given the clarity of the reasoning and the eminence of the author, future decisions are likely to
274
follow the Weinstein opinion.
Perhaps the most famous denial of deference to the FDA's interpretation of its own preemption power occurred in the Supreme
Court's 5-4 split in Brown & Williamson.2 75 The case arose out of the
See supra Part XIII (discussing the preemption preamble).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Neb. 2006) ("Nothing
in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act shall be
construed as invalidating any provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of
such amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict. . . ." (quoting Pub. L. No.
87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962); Peters v. Astrazeneca, LP, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1051,
1055-56 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn.
2005) ("Defendant's preemption argument ultimately fails because Congress has not expressed a specific intent to preempt state consumer-protection laws in the area of prescription-drug labeling."); McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286(JBS), 2005 WL 3752269, at
*10 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005); Zikis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-C-8104, 2005 WL 1126909, at *2
(N.D. Ill. May 9, 2005); Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881-87 (E.D. Tex.
2005).
271
Witczak, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
272
DeSiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97-98 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006), affd sub
nom. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008) (per curiam).
273
See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240-41, 275-78 (E.D.N.Y.
2007) (defending the "important regulatory role" of state tort claims).
See Thomas Adcock, Judge Honored for Protecting Women, Children, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 5,
274
2007, at 24 (describing Judge Weinstein as "known for his expertise in mass tort cases" and
"likewise esteemed" for his involvement in civil rights litigation).
529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000) ("In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly pre275
cluded the FDA from asserting jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.").
269
270
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FDA's attempt to regulate cigarettes as medical devices that deliver
nicotine, 276 an attempt that drew international attention and industry
opposition so extensive as to garner "purportedly more [input] than
any agency had ever received in a rulemaking proceeding."' 2 77 Deference to the FDA's interpretation of the statutory terms at issue was
crucial for the Agency to retain jurisdiction over cigarettes. 278 The
majority rejected claims of deference to the FDA's definition of the
statutory term "device," finding that years of conscious refusal to act
by Congress were functionally equivalent to an implicit denial of the
Agency's power to regulate cigarettes. 2 79 The majority concluded
that, absent some congressional decision, FDA regulation could not
derive from implied authority over the regulated item. 28 0 It was a dramatic decision that has had ripple effects on the law of deference to
28
administrative rules. 1
xvI
ARE COURTS INFLUENCED BY MEDIA PERCEPTIONS?

Regardless of media perceptions, the only opinions of the FDA
that really matter are those of the small number ofjudges who decide
whether to give deference to FDA action. 282 However, the media's
negative portrayal of the politicized Agency may cast doubt on its legal
arguments in the courtroom: judges are susceptible to the same
human influences from past and current experiences and from information flows.
Two briefs sit before a federal judge, one favoring the FDA's position and one opposing, usually focused on ambiguous statutory language in a convoluted section of the FD&C Act. 28 3 The challenge
Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,616 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified
276
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 897).
277
William B. Schultz, I Met the President Because of WordPerfect 6.1, in CENTURY OF PROTECTION, supranote 21, at 111. Schultz is the former FDA Deputy Commissioner for Policy.
278
See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 ("In fact, the FDA contends that, were it to
determine that tobacco products provide no 'reasonable assurance of safety,' it would have
the authority to ban cigarettes and smokeless tobacco entirely.").
279
See id. at 144 ("Congress has created a distinct regulatory scheme to address the
problem of tobacco and health, and that scheme, as presently constructed, precludes any
role for the FDA.").
280
See id. at 160 ("[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a
fashion.").
281
See, e.g.,
Case Comment, Review of Administrative Action, Limits on Agency Discretion:
Massachusetts v. EPA, 121 HARv.L. REv. 415, 421 (2007) (opining that Brown & Williamson
indicated a step towards "a greater oversight role" for courts).
282
See supra Part II.
283
The 1938 Act has been amended more than 100 times. See HuTr, MERRILL &
GROSSMAN, supra note 255, at 14. The Act has enormously complex ambiguities for the
courts to interpret. See Guy v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 812 F.2d 911, 916 (4th Cir. 1987)
("[T]he Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act establishes a complex enforcement scheme.").
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does not reach the jurist in a vacuum. It would be incorrect to presume that judges are impervious to the media, and also incorrect to
presume that judges do not pay attention to coverage of government
agencies, such as the FDA, that affect them and their families. While
no statistical sampling of federal judges' opinions can be performed
for purposes of this Article, it is reasonable speculation federal judges
on average are well read and cognizant of political forces, even long
after their ascent to the bench. 284 News coverage of White House involvement in FDA decision making may undercut any presumption of
detached, scientific objectivity that the Agency will plead in those
briefs seeking deference, as can be seen by the recent rise in cases
2 5
refusing deference to FDA decisions.
The impact of losing one or more federal judges as deferential
patrons of the FDA's policies would be extremely damaging to the
Agency in its second century. 286 Doubt about the jurisprudential basis
for claiming deference would disable the FDA's potent regulatory
power of deterrence. Yet the possibility of judges abandoning their
traditional deferential review of FDA decisions may already be becoming a reality in the courts. For example, consider Judge Weinstein's
refusal to find preemption in In re Zyprexa.287 Judge Weinstein may
have set the definitive tone for the FDA's legal position when he
quipped: "The FDA cannot be allowed to usher in such a sweeping
288
change in substantive law through the back door."
XVII
WOULD A LESS POLITICIZED

FDA

REGAIN DEFERENCE?

As a result of its defeats in the preemptive preamble dispute, the
FDA has suffered a loss of legitimacy. 28 9 The Plan B fiasco has contributed to this loss by drawing media attention to insiders' perceptions that science was secondary to the assuaging of certain
conservative constituencies. 290 What must the FDA do to reclaim its
legitimacy in the eyes of the public- and, perhaps more importantly,
284
See Linda Greenhouse, Essay, Telling the Court's Story: Justice and Journalism at the
Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1555 (1996) (discussing an interplay between the Supreme Court and the media).
285 See supra Part XV.
286
Losing one judge's deferential position to the FDA would have a large impact because the actual number ofjudges that review FDA decisions is so few. See supra Part II.
287 In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y.2007).
288 Id. at 275.
289 See supra Part XIII (discussing the "preemption preamble" dispute); see also Christine H. Kim, The Case for Preemption of PrescriptionDrug Failure-To-Warn Claims, 62 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 399, 401 (2007) (noting "mounting charges of regulatory capture" of the FDA).
290 See supra Part XII (discussing the Plan B dispute); see also Wood et. al., supra note
170, at 1199 ("Will we ever again be able to believe in the FDA's independence?").
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in the eyes of judges deciding whether to give deference to the
Agency?
The FDA must reclaim its regulatory independence so that career
scientists may make reasoned choices-even if those choices offend
some voters or political action committee donors-without interference from the White House. Ideally, calls or e-mails from the White
House staff would not impact product approvals; 29 1 the FDA would
base policy decisions solely on elements listed in the statutory standards; it would evaluate product status on a scientific basis alone; label
content decisions would emphasize medical rather than legal factors;
FDA management would be selected for their nationally recognized
scientific credentials rather than on political recommendations; 292
and the FDA career staff's work would be judged on its technical merits, making retention of skilled scientific employees easier.
Obtaining these ideals might remove the taint of recent political
motivations behind FDA decisions and thus restore its reputation in
the eyes of the judiciary. The Agency might thereby regain the deference it has historically been accorded.
CONCLUSIONS

Mark Twain once reportedly quipped: "The report of my death
was an exaggeration."' 293 As one who has studied the Food and Drug
Administration intensely for thirty-five years, I hesitate to prematurely
predict the "Death of Deference." Judicial acceptance of the FDA's
prowess as a regulator has been a hardy phenomenon. However, the
capture of the Agency's political leadership by agents of its regulated
industries has been manifest in the visible policy shifts described
above. I believe the tipping point of this regulatory capture has been
reached in this, the second century of the FDA's existence.
If Dr. Wiley29 4 were to study the FDA today, he would likely write

excoriating editorials about the need for muckrakers to challenge the
Agency's loss of stature as an independent consumer protector. Some
of the FDA's most formidable career officials have been quite independent and assertive of the prerogative that the Agency has enjoyed,
291
Ex parte contacts by persons outside the Agency during an adjudication of a new
drug application are not unlawful because the prohibition in § 557(d) only applies to formal adjudications, and virtually all new drug licensure is done informally. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 557(a), (d) (2000). As a result, they should probably be permitted in most cases; in any
event, they appear to be a fact of Agency life. See HAW-rHORNE, supra note 1, at 153-56
(discussing the phone calls and letters from Congress that sometimes reach drug
reviewers).
292 See supra note 151 (listing examples of politically motivated appointments).
293 N.Y. J., June 2, 1897.
294
For a thoughtful account of Dr. Wiley's contribution to food science, see U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Harvey W Wiley: Pioneer ConsumerActivist, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE, Jan./
Feb. 2006, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2006/106wiley.html; see also supra Part V.
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both with the public and the courts. 295 In a democratic system with
co-equal branches of government, it is essential that an administrative
agency earn and preserve the courts' respect and deference so that
the agency's mission is not compromised by judicial review of its disputed rules, licenses, and enforcement actions. When an agency veers
off course, charting an ultra vires direction for itself, it is the duty of
the independent judiciary to hold it accountable for deviations from
the statutory purpose for which it exists. 296 As Justice Scalia once
noted, "Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not the sorcerer himself."297 Regrettably, the efforts of the Bush Administration
to practice alchemy with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
may deter courts from giving deference to this sorcerer's apprentice
for years to come.

295
See 151 CONG. REc. S10,249 (2005) (statement of Sen. Murray) (warning against
using the FDA, "long admired around the world for its neutrality and professionalism," as a
"political tool").
296
See 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(2) (2000).
297
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)).
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